

The challenge today in Sudan is to accept an obligation to act on the diplomatic and humanitarian front without becoming militarily engaged. The killing and displacement must be stopped, but little could be more counter-productive than a perceived U.S. military intervention against a third Muslim nation at this time.

In this year's presidential race there is a profound debate about whether a U.N. mandate is necessary before America can act militarily. Both major party candidates have properly noted that the U.S. reserves the right to act alone. While each gives different emphasis to the wisdom of receiving international sanction, each also recognizes the preferability, although not necessity, of obtaining international support. What hasn't been discussed is the question of whether the U.S. reserves the right not to engage militarily even if there is a U.N. mandate to act. The answer is clearly yes. We reserve the right not to use force, just as we reserve the right to defend ourselves.

Sudan is a case in point. The U.S. is attempting to nudge the Security Council in a more attentive way, but our emphasis is properly on pressing for African Union rather than U.S. force deployment, with the understanding that we may have to give material and logistic support to African soldiers. Such an approach was well envisioned by the founders of the U.N. Indeed, with the principal exception of the Korean war, the Big Five of the Security Council have traditionally provided the funding for peacekeeping forces, while the troops themselves have generally been drawn from smaller or non-aligned countries, such as Canada, Nigeria and India.

In this context, an operation to bring peace to Darfur should involve many countries and, as the Special Representative to the Secretary General for Sudan Jan Pronk said, be "broad, big, and quick." U.S. focus should be on:

1. Humanitarian assistance. Some aid is already en route, purchased with money diverted from Iraq. More is required. The need is dire and urgent. People of Darfur lack adequate shelter, potable water and health care facilities. They do not expect to see a usable harvest until January 2006.

2. Regional Organizations. To carry out its mission, the African Union needs a broad mandate for at least 3,500 armed and unarmed troops and authority to use force if necessary. As it is, the AU, currently has a limited mandate for a 305-person armed force serving to protect 100 or so unarmed monitors of the April 8th cease fire between the Sudan Liberation Army, the Justice and Equity Movement and government forces.

3. Negotiations. These must be pursued on two fronts. One, to settle the 21-year-old conflict between the North (the government) and the South of Sudan; the other, to bring peace to Darfur. The two situations are interrelated and neither can be credibly brought to a close without the other. An agreement between the North and the South hopefully can provide a framework for a settlement between the rebels and the Sudanese government in Darfur, but progress on the first front should not be a condition to seek progress on the second.

4. Leverage. The U.S. and the U.N. are preparing a list of sanctions to induce the Sudanese government to comply. In the bill before us, H.R. 5061, the President is empowered to freeze Sudanese assets, restrict travel and impose other sanctions. It is a mistake, however, to put the heat solely on the Sudanese

government. Pressure must also be applied on the rebels to stop ambushing humanitarian aid convoys.

A strong international approach to Darfur has the prospect of stabilizing a dire situation and serving as a reminder to all governments that sovereignty is not a shield behind which genocidalists can hide. Combating genocide is a world responsibility. With humanitarian aid, support for the AU, a double-pronged negotiating strategy and a carrot-and-stick approach, the prospect that Sudan can move toward greater peace and security for its citizens is promising. But a timely commitment of the international community is key. It has yet to be established.

This resolution is modest but important step in the right direction. I urge its passage.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD IMPROVE AIRPORT PERIMETER SECURITY

HON. GREGORY W. MEEKS

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 7, 2004

Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, anxieties about airport security have increased. Most visible improvements and modifications—such as passenger screening—have already been done. Less visible improvements, particularly in terms of protecting airport perimeters against unauthorized entry, are lagging.

A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that airport perimeter security has not appreciably improved in the past three years, despite persistent expressions of concern by Congress. The funds provided for these purposes have not been delivered to airports where they are needed.

This report's title tells the whole story: "Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls." In it, the GAO notes that "through funding of a limited number security enhancements, TSA [the Transportation Security Agency] has helped to improve perimeter and access control security at some airports. However, at the time of our review, TSA had not yet developed a plan to prioritize expenditures to ensure that funds provided have the greatest impact in improving the security of the commercial airport system."

The safety and security of our airports and air passengers are contingent on the priorities established by the TSA and other government agencies.

Congress recognizes this, and in response to the terrorist attacks on our country, it established the Federal Airport Security Capital Fund to finance improvements at U.S. airports. This fund provides \$250,000,000 a year to be parcelled out according to a legally-mandated formula by the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Under Secretary for Borders and Transportation at the Department of Homeland Security. Despite this fund's existence, much remains to be done.

In a "report card" published by the Airline Pilots Association, airport perimeter security in the United States was given an overall grade of "D." Based on the judgment of those who

have reason to know the situation best, a grade like this is shameful and unacceptable.

Several key airports have been identified as having particular needs for expeditious improvements. These include the four airports administered by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Islip, JFK, LaGuardia, Newark); Chicago O'Hare; BWI; the airports in Allentown, Harrisburg, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Birmingham International Airport in Alabama.

In recent months, it has been my privilege to consult with several private-sector experts on airport perimeter security. Dr. Walter Estulin, Philip Allen, and David Brownstein of the New York-based high-technology company, L-3 Communications, have taken time to explain to me how off-the-shelf technology can be used to protect our airports from intruders and infiltrators who can undermine the integrity of our air transportation system. Scientists and engineers from L-3 Communications have examined the problems faced by airports (and, by extension, seaports and inland harbors) and have developed technology that can go a long way toward meeting the security needs of transportation infrastructure. One issue of particular concern is the proliferation of MANPADS—"Man-Portable Air Defense Systems"—or, in a nutshell, shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles. In a GAO report published in May 2004, we learn that "MANPADS pose a threat to commercial aircraft for several reasons. First, MANPADS are widely available. . . . The U.S. government estimates that a few thousand MANPADS are outside government controls. . . . Second, the characteristics of MANPADS—their lethality, portability, ease of use and concealment, and relatively low cost (from less than \$1,000 to \$100,000 each)—make them attractive to terrorists for acquisition and use against commercial aircraft. Third, MANPADS have been successfully used to attack and bring down aircraft." So far, luckily, none of these weapons have been used successfully within the United States. Still, in the "report card" from the Airline Pilots Association, defense against anti-aircraft missiles was given a grade of "F." This is certainly a cause for concern.

There are two actions we can take to address these matters. First, Congress should direct the Secretary of Transportation to better prioritize grants made under his authority under the Federal Airport Security Capital Fund.

Second, we should pass legislation now under consideration, introduced by Senators JAY ROCKEFELLER (D-West Virginia), JOHN MCCAIN (R-Arizona), and ERNEST HOLLINGS (D-South Carolina), called the "Aviation Security Advancement Act" (S. 2393). If passed, this bill would authorize \$100,000,000 for the Department of Homeland Security "for airport perimeter security technology, fencing, security contracts, vehicle tagging, and other perimeter security related operations, facilities, and equipment." This sum should be doubled. Surely \$200,000,000 is a small price to pay to assure the safety and security of the millions of Americans who travel by air each year.